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“[I]t doesn’t bother me if I happen to agree with the mainstream media [in criticizing the Soviet Union]. 
Trotsky … was charged in the 1930s with agreeing with the fascists in his condemnation of the Soviet Union. 
And he pointed out that his critique was true; he wasn’t going to abandon it if somebody else happened to 
say it for different reasons.” 
- Noam Chomsky, in response to being challenged for agreeing with the mainstream media in
condemnation of the Soviet Union.1
“[I]t's okay to know it's Mussolini. Look, Mussolini was Mussolini. It's okay to—it's a very good quote, it's 
a very interesting quote, and I know it. I saw it. I saw what—and I know who said it. But what difference 
does it make whether it's Mussolini or somebody else? It's certainly a very interesting quote.” 
- Donald Trump, in response to being challenged for tweeting a quote sometimes attributed to
Mussolini, “It is better to live one day as a lion than 100 years as a sheep.”2
“On one occasion he was being praised by some wicked men, and said, ‘I am sadly afraid that I must have 
done some wicked thing.’” 
- Diogenes Laertius, on the philosopher Antisthenes.3
1. THE PROBLEM
Like Noam Chomsky and Donald Trump, we are typically unmoved—except by 
irritation—when someone lambastes us for agreeing with a source that is morally or 
intellectually suspect by our own lights. But accusations of guilt-by-epistemic-association 
are asymmetrically popular: we tend to issue them in contexts of disagreement, yet think 
they bear little relevance for the truth of our own views. This is a mistake. We sometimes 
face what I call the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. This is the problem of 
encountering agreement about the content of your belief from an unwelcome source. The 
problem of unwelcome epistemic company is scarcely explored by philosophers, yet it is a 
problem of everyday life. 
In what follows, I elaborate four iterations of the problem that unwelcome epistemic 
company poses. To this end, I introduce and discuss some simple cases. I then offer 
preliminary lessons of the problem, and I canvass possible responses, ranging from the 
1 Chomsky (1989). 
2 Trump (2016). 
3 Laertius (1853: 219). 
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extreme confidence of Chomsky and Trump to an epistemic prudishness that always seeks 
to reduce agreement with unwelcome sources. 
2. ITERATIONS 
 In circumscribing the problem of unwelcome epistemic company we must 
appreciate that not all unwelcome epistemic company poses a problem—even a prima facie 
one. Consider the following case: 
Blue Sky: You believe that the sky is blue. Then you find out that Osama bin Laden also believed 
that the sky is blue. 
 
This case does not even threaten to pose a problem, either epistemic or moral. Although 
bin Laden might be unwelcome epistemic company of some sort, his company poses none 
of the problems that I describe below. In particular, bin Laden’s agreement about the color 
of the sky raises no epistemic or moral issues about your own belief that the sky is blue, or 
the role of your moral character in coming to that belief. 
 Here is a case, on the other hand, where you might face any of at least four different 
problems due to unwelcome epistemic company: 
Refugees: You haven’t read much on refugee crime rates in the United States, but you pay some 
attention to the news. Despite being generally in favor of increased acceptance of refugees, you find 
yourself with the belief that refugees, on average, commit more crimes than citizens. You then 
encounter a white nationalist who also believes that refugees commit more crimes than citizens. 
 
Two of the problems that may be raised by Refugees are distinctly epistemic, and two are 
moral. The epistemic problems have to do with your belief’s truth or normative status, and 
the moral problems have to do with its etiology or implications. I will address these in 
order. 
2.1 Epistemic problems 
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In Refugees, agreement may provide some defeasible evidence that your belief is 
false. In other words, the problem of unwelcome epistemic company might take the 
following general form: 
Falsity: The fact that S believes that p is evidence that ~p. 
This is a problem having to do with the truth of your belief. But how bad is the problem? 
The amount of evidence that unwelcome epistemic company provides in cases like 
Refugees partly depends on just how unreliable one has reason to believe S really is. In 
Refugees, this is left unstated. If the white nationalist just gets the relevant matters wrong 
frequently relative to the average person, but still very rarely, then perhaps you need not 
worry too much, and what degrees of error bother you will depend partly on your tolerance 
for epistemic risk.4 
But suppose that your epistemic company does provide a great deal of evidence 
that your belief is false—say, because they get relevant matters wrong well over 50% of 
the time. (After all, even agreement from a source that gets relevant matters right 51% of 
the time is some evidence that the belief in question is true.5) In that case, agreement 
provides evidence that your belief is false. 
We are only very rarely able to assess the actual, or even approximate, degree of 
unreliability of any particular person (or even ourselves), whether in general or in specific 
domains. In light of this, the possibility of frequent error need only be salient in order that 
Falsity might apply to a case of unwelcome agreement. Even if you cannot assign an exact 
or even vague probability to someone’s error, as long as there is a salient possibility that 
 
4 For an illuminating discussion of epistemic risk and its relationship to epistemic luck and knowledge, see 
Pritchard (2016). 
5 Thanks to Alex Worsnip for emphasizing this in conversation. 
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they are more unreliable than not within the relevant domain, their unwelcome agreement 
in that domain can warrant concern. 
All that being said, even if your unwelcome company is extremely unreliable, the 
normative force of the evidence provided by Falsity will partly depend on your independent 
evidence for the proposition subject to unwelcome agreement. If you already know that 
you came to believe via a route that secures more warrant for you than the warrant that 
your company secures for the negation of your belief, then you may not face much of a 
problem at all. For example, suppose you calculate that 35+15=50, and a mathematically 
incompetent person calculates the same. Even if this person gets simple arithmetic 
questions wrong 95% of the time, the evidence provided by their agreement is decisively 
defeated by your prior, independent evidence for the proposition. Your total evidence 
makes it likely that this is just one of those unlikely cases where an extremely unreliable 
person got a calculation right. Although unwelcome agreement that 35+15=50 is perhaps 
some evidence that 35+15≠50, such evidence is decisively defeated by your overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.6 This is not a situation in which you do not face the problem of 
Falsity at all; rather, it is a situation in which the problem of Falsity is just not very severe. 
The qualification about independent evidence is why it is important to the 
formulation of Refugees that “you haven’t read much on refugee crime rates in the United 
States.” If you have read a great deal on refugee crime rates, then it is likely that you have 
independent evidence to defeat the evidence of unwelcome agreement. The need for this 
qualification in order for the problem to seem more serious suggests that the problem of 
 
6 Cf. Lackey (2010:308) for discussion of this kind of example in the case of disagreement, in which a 
putative epistemic peer disputes that 2+2=4. Based on what she says there, however, I think that Lackey 
would deny that either the peer disagreement or unwelcome epistemic company provides any evidence at all, 
given the strength of one’s prior justification. 
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unwelcome epistemic company, at least in the form of Falsity, is faced more commonly by 
laypersons than by experts. (By “experts” I mean to include both credentialed experts and 
autodidacts.) This is because laypersons are much less likely than experts to have 
independent lines of evidence that defeat the sort of evidence that unwelcome agreement 
provides. 
So, if the white nationalist’s beliefs about crimes committed by refugees are likely 
false, or there is at least a salient possibility that they are likely false, then you face the 
problem of Falsity. But there are three other distinct problems you might face. The 
following, like Falsity, is an epistemic problem: 
Malfunction: The fact that S believes that p provides evidence that you acquired your belief p via an 
epistemically faulty process. 
 
Perhaps white nationalists are likely to hold their beliefs about refugees on the basis of or 
otherwise due to some faulty epistemic process—even when their beliefs are true. If so, 
then the fact that the white nationalist shares your belief about refugees provides some 
evidence that your belief-forming process is in some way bad—even if your belief is true. 
In this form, unwelcome epistemic company may give you evidence about the reasoning 
or other process behind your belief. Whereas Falsity provides you with an alethic defeater, 
Malfunction provides you with a rationality defeater. 
It is worth emphasizing that Malfunction is broader than just a claim about your 
reasoning processes. Perhaps you arrived at the belief in question intuitively, via 
perception, or otherwise on the basis of an immediate, direct judgment. For these kinds of 
beliefs, unwelcome epistemic company may pose the problem of calling into question the 
truth-conduciveness of the relevant cognitive faculties or processes. Alongside reasoning, 
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intuitive reactions are one of many processes for acquiring beliefs, and so both sorts of 
processes are covered by Malfunction. 
In the case of Refugees, the application of Malfunction seems especially plausible. 
It may be that white nationalists tend to make inferences about refuges as a class on the 
basis of sensationalist anecdotes that are prominent in the news. This is not a good form of 
reasoning, but it may be that you, too—despite your generally favorable attitude toward 
refugees—are engaging in it. This sort of epistemic similarity is just the kind of problem 
that unwelcome agreement can help us to discover. 
As with Falsity, the evidence provided by Malfunction is defeasible. In addition to 
overwhelming independent evidence for the truth of your belief, you might also have 
overwhelming independent evidence for the differences in the rational bases between your 
belief and the white nationalist’s. The importance of this qualification is further evidence 
that the problem of unwelcome epistemic company is worse for laypersons than for experts, 
because experts are more likely than laypersons (though certainly not guaranteed) to 
already have a thorough accounting of both their and their opponents’ rational bases for 
their beliefs. 
2.2 Moral problems 
 Beyond the epistemic defeaters identified by Falsity and Malfunction, Refugees 
potentially raises two moral problems. The first is a problem for your own moral behavior 
or character: 
Vice: The fact that S believes that p provides evidence that your belief that p is connected in some 
way to a moral vice. 
 
Whether or not it is false or based on faulty cognitive processes, your belief about refugees 
might be the sort of view that attracts people with a certain kind of moral vice, e.g., the 
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vice of racism as manifested by white nationalism. When you discover your agreement 
with the white nationalist, a distinctly moral possibility is made salient to you. Perhaps you 
have a vicious character trait that attracts people to the belief in question, or are at least 
carrying on in a manner characteristic of this trait, and this is part of how you came to hold 
your belief. In this way, your unwelcome epistemic company acts as a mirror of the sort of 
person you might be or might be becoming—a sort of person that you do not want to be. 
Figuring out to what degree your unwelcome company raises the likelihood of Vice 
is tricky. After all, it could be that racist tendencies make it very likely that you will believe 
that refugees commit more crimes, but that believing that refugees commit more crimes 
does not make it at all likely that you have racist tendencies. Presumably, something 
structurally similar to this possibility drives Chomsky’s thoughts in the quotation that 
opens this paper, wherein Chomsky appeals to the fact that the mainstream media has 
“different reasons” from his. But notice that someone motivated to figure out which of 
these probabilistic relationships obtains has in a sense already conceded that they face Vice 
as a problem. After all, figuring out where one stands here is precisely a way of responding 
to the problem of unwelcome epistemic company in the form of Vice; it is not a way of 
showing that there was no problem in the first place. Another way to put the point is that 
one is not called on, absent some special reason, to check whether one’s view makes it 
likely that one is vicious in a particular way. Rather, this is something that one might be 
inclined to do precisely in the face of a particular kind of unwelcome epistemic company. 
This paper argues that this kind of double-checking can be rational. 
Like the epistemic problems, the evidence that Vice provides is defeasible. Even in 
the formulation of Refugees, the fact that you are “generally in favor of increased 
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acceptance of refugees” is some evidence against your being bigoted toward them, though 
it is hardly decisive. Here, being an expert rather than a layperson is not as strong a 
protection against the evidence that unwelcome agreement provides. Expertise in refugee 
issues does not necessarily include expertise in or even reflection on one’s own moral 
attitude toward refugees, and expertise in general is just not the same thing as morally 
critical self-reflection. 
 Vice is not the only moral problem raised by Refugees. The case also raises the 
following moral problem, not about your own moral character, but about the implications 
of the content of your belief: 
Implication: The fact that S believes that p provides evidence that you missed something important 
about the stakes of p that is relevant to the endorsement of p. 
 
Perhaps you do not, either implicitly or explicitly, share the vicious character trait that 
motivates your unwelcome company to agree with you. Nevertheless, it may be that they 
agree with you because they see something about the matter of agreement that you do not, 
and it is precisely something that appeals only to people who are vicious in a particular 
way, or something that makes this particular matter more important than you at first 
realized. In the case of crimes committed by refugees, perhaps what really attracts white 
nationalists, though it does not function as a reason for their belief, is that high crime rates 
among refugees in turn helps to justify restricting acceptance of refugees, and this is (let us 
suppose) something that you have never considered. Whether or not this new information 
will ultimately change your mind, it is reasonable to react to the unwelcome epistemic 
company of the white nationalist partly by worrying that such information might exist, and 
double-checking accordingly. Given that you are someone who thinks that the acceptance 
of refugees is morally important, the evidence provided by Implication raises the stakes of 
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the matter. If you end up maintaining your belief, it will be in spite of, not regardless of, 
this new evidence. What the white nationalist may give you is some good evidence that 
there is something that makes careful inquiry into the question especially important.7 
 Refugees is a case where you very well may face any of at least four different 
versions of the problem of unwelcome epistemic company, two of which are epistemic and 
two of which are moral. But it is important to recognize that these versions of the problem 
are related to each other in complicated ways. For example, consider the following case, in 
which one might argue that only the moral problems arise: 
Selectivity: You and Fred are in the same academic department in 1930s Germany. Fred is known 
to be antisemitic and is meticulous when it comes to finding faults in his Jewish colleagues’ work. 
When it comes to everyone else, however, Fred just doesn’t pay that much attention. Despite not 
thinking of yourself as an antisemite, you find that your own view of your Jewish colleagues matches 
Fred’s, and that you also don’t pay that much attention otherwise. 
 
Selectivity is a case where your belief is at least threatened by Vice and Implication, but it 
is not obvious whether it is threatened by Falsity or Malfunction. While I do not think that 
it is in fact common that someone is rationally and accurately attuned to all and only the 
faults of one’s Jewish colleagues, less theoretically ideal cases that resemble this one do 
exist in the real world, and so it is a useful possibility to explore. 
 First, what is wrong with Fred, such that his agreement poses a problem? Fred’s 
particular beliefs about his Jewish colleagues do not in themselves—ex hypothesi—
immediately reveal any distinctly epistemic problems, but in their wider context or pattern, 
they reveal serious moral problems, and these problems underwrite the application of Vice 
 
7 Throughout the foregoing, I have alternated between speaking of a single white nationalist and white 
nationalists in the plural. Do numbers matter? With Jennifer Lackey (2013), I think that they do, even in cases 
where the beliefs in question are “dependent” either via their source or other mechanisms. Lackey’s 
discussion is in the context of the problem of disagreement, but similar points will hold for the problems of 
unwelcome epistemic company. Finding out that white nationalists in general agree with your belief will put 
additional pressure on your belief beyond only finding out that a single white nationalist agrees. 
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and Implication to the case. Vice applies to encountering Fred’s epistemic company, 
because Fred’s record of accuracy and rationality about his Jewish colleagues is plausibly 
due to a moral vice: antisemitism. It takes a peculiar sort of selective attention to identify 
all and only the faults of one’s Jewish colleagues. And it is morally objectionable to focus 
one’s epistemic energies on all and only crimes committed by members of that group, even 
if one does so in an epistemically excellent manner. So when you find yourself agreeing 
with Fred, you acquire evidence both that your belief is epistemically appropriate (as far 
as truth and evaluation of evidence is concerned) and that this is due to something morally 
vicious. 
 Implication may also apply to Selectivity, because it is highly plausible that 
expending selective energy on identifying and pursuing faults only among Jewish 
colleagues in Nazi Germany serves to prolong and intensify systemic oppression of Jewish 
people. Perhaps this is something that (either implicitly or explicitly) appeals to Fred. As 
with Vice, this is wholly consistent with you being within your purely epistemic rights in 
believing what you believe. The upshot is that, because there are moral constraints on 
epistemic practice (in this case, how we direct our critical attention), and violating these 
constraints is compatible with obeying purely epistemic constraints, it seems possible to 
face the moral but not the epistemic problems of unwelcome epistemic company. 
 However, things are not so simple. In particular, there are reasons for thinking that 
Vice and Implication are reducible to Malfunction. I will consider these in order. Vice may 
reduce to Malfunction, because the presence of a moral vice (e.g., antisemitism) in the 
etiology of a belief seems to provide some (defeasible) grounds for debunking that belief 
via a rationality-defeater. This may be the case, but it need not be. Notice that the case of 
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Selectivity itself actually avoids such a debunking—and, therefore, avoids a reduction from 
Vice to Malfunction. How does it do this? The moral vice of antisemitism does not play a 
rationalizing role in the actual content of the matter of unwelcome agreement. Rather, the 
moral vice is merely the putative cause of Fred’s (otherwise excellent) epistemic skills 
being directed as they are. Compare a purely moral case of someone in a dominant racial 
group who helps all and only people who share their racial identity, on the basis of 
antipathy toward those who do not. There is one sense in which a person’s actions (helping 
so-and-so) are morally right, but another sense (helping only so-and-so, for bad reasons) in 
which they are wrong. In such a case, the (narrowly) right actions, in the relevant context, 
provide evidence for a moral vice. Likewise, in cases that resemble Selectivity, there is 
nothing wrong with the beliefs per se, epistemically speaking. But, in the wider social as 
well as motivational context, these beliefs provide evidence of a moral vice. In finding that 
we agree with such a person, we may worry that we share this vice. 
 Notice further that, even in cases where we can extract the problem of Malfunction 
from the problem of Vice (say, because a moral vice does play a rationalizing role for the 
belief) this is not a full reduction. If it turns out that your belief that p is the result of faulty 
reasoning in precisely the sense that it is based on epistemically irrelevant racist attitudes, 
you still face two distinct problems. True, in this kind of case, the moral problem (having 
racist attitudes) itself poses an epistemic problem (having irrational beliefs), but that does 
not mean that having racist attitudes fully reduces to having irrational beliefs. Another way 
to put the point: having immoral attitudes is a problem, and using them irrationally is 
another. 
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 What about Implication? It might seem that Implication reduces to Malfunction, 
because to the extent that you miss the implications of the content of your belief, your 
reasoning is impoverished. However, as with Vice, this merely shows that Implication can 
pose an epistemic problem in addition to a moral problem, as when a bad implication of a 
belief is also a rational ground for rejecting it. A controversial instance of this phenomenon 
involves what is sometimes called “pragmatic encroachment.” Some philosophers have 
recently argued that the epistemic standards for holding a particular belief might be raised 
in cases where the purely practical stakes of that belief are likewise raised.8 If this view is 
right, then in cases where the evidence of Implication is evidence of high stakes, it might 
give you reason to think your belief is insufficiently justified. This is one way in which a 
moral problem of unwelcome epistemic company can in turn pose an epistemic problem. 
But this need not be the situation. After investigating a matter of unwelcome 
agreement, you may find both that there was nothing wrong with your prior reasoning and 
that you were non-culpably ignorant of some unseemly implication of the content of your 
belief that attracts people with a particular moral vice but does not raise the stakes for that 
belief. 
 Perhaps less surprisingly, you might face the epistemic but not the moral problems 
of unwelcome epistemic company. Consider the following case: 
Calculator: You are calculating a complicated tip at a restaurant. You are aware that your companion 
has a peculiar calculator programmed to frequently but not always make errors in basic arithmetic 
that are very common among human beings. The calculator agrees with you.9 
 
Calculator is a case where your belief is threatened by Falsity and Malfunction, but neither 
Vice nor Implication. Epistemically speaking, the issues you face are similar to those in 
 
8 This view originates with Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (2002). 
9  This case is inspired by David Christensen’s (2007) classic example of disagreement regarding the 
calculation of a tip at a restaurant. 
        
 
14 
Refugees, and their severity likewise depends on the frequency of error and your tolerance 
of epistemic risk. But (unless the calculator is really peculiar) there are no grounds for 
worrying about your moral character or morally relevant implications of your calculation.  
3. Responses 
How should one respond to the various problems of unwelcome epistemic 
company? I have already described both the cases and the interpretations of the cases in 
ways that reveal the flavor of my own answer to this question, but now I want to step back. 
I have imagined and commended various forms of doubting, revising, and rechecking one’s 
beliefs or character when one encounters either a case best interpreted by Falsity, 
Malfunction, Vice, or Implication. Am I right to commend these responses?  
 The general problem of unwelcome epistemic company is a problem having to do 
with what epistemologists sometimes call “higher-order evidence.” Unfortunately for my 
purposes, the term is given a variety of disparate definitions across the literature. The term 
“higher-order evidence” may refer to any combination of evidence about evidence 10; 
evidence about evidentiary relations 11 ; evidence about cognitive processes 12 ; or just 
indirect evidence about a proposition or belief. Unwelcome epistemic company may 
provide higher-order evidence in any of these senses. For example, cases of unwelcome 
epistemic company that pose the problem of Falsity seem to provide a kind of indirect 
evidence about the specific content of agreement, whereas cases that pose Malfunction 
seem to provide evidence about evidence, the evaluation of evidence, cognitive function, 
and much else. 
 
10  This is similar to the characterization by Richard Feldman (2009: 304ff), though his discussion of 
“evidential significance” plausibly covers the next two as well. 
11 Christensen (2010: 185-186). 
12 Lasonen-Aario (2014: 315-316). 
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 Because the problems of unwelcome epistemic company have to do with a certain 
kind of higher-order evidence, appropriate responses will likely resemble responses to 
other problems having to with higher-order evidence, especially the problem of peer 
disagreement. For example, faced with a case of unwelcome epistemic company, you will 
oppose any sort of revision of belief or double-checking if you endorse 
Extreme Steadfastness: In response to unwelcome epistemic company in believing that p, you should 
maintain your credence that p and resist any introspective moral concern on the basis of the 
unwelcome agreement.13 
 
According to Extreme Steadfastness, unwelcome epistemic company poses no real 
problem at all. Of course, even those who reject Extreme Steadfastness as a general 
response to higher-order evidence may, like Chomsky and Trump, embrace it when 
confronted with unwelcome epistemic company. And there is a wide array of cases of 
unwelcome epistemic company that are, like Blue Sky, typically (and correctly) treated as 
irrelevant. Vegetarians are generally not bothered by their agreement with Hitler; critics of 
American interventionism in the Middle East are generally not bothered by their agreement 
with members of ISIS; Mennonite theists are generally not bothered by their agreement 
about the existence of God with the Westboro Baptist Church; and so on. Cases like these 
anecdotally support the popular thought that guilt-by-epistemic-association is no more a 
good foundation of criticism than its more general counterpart. But clearly not all cases are 
alike. Refugees bears on one’s belief in a way that agreement with Hitler about 
vegetarianism does not. 
 What really does the work in the cases where we justifiably reject guilt-by-
epistemic-association is not the mere logical compatibility to which Chomsky and Trump 
 
13  Cf. the formulation of “Extreme steadfastness” by Alex Worsnip (2014). For steadfast views in the 
literature on disagreement, see Rosen (2001), Kelly (2005), and Enoch (2010). 
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appeal, but rather that we judge that the unwelcome features of one’s epistemic company 
simply do not bear in a relevant way (or to the relevant degree) on the belief’s truth, 
normative status, etiology, or implications—as in Blue Sky, above. Sometimes there can 
be a dispute about whether the problem of unwelcome epistemic company arises. For 
example, in the case of critics of American interventionism and members of ISIS, those 
who make accusations of guilt-by-epistemic-association may believe that some single, 
objectionable underlying characteristic motivates both parties. But rather than simply state 
the banality that A member of ISIS believes that p is compatible with p, one should instead 
interrogate which kind of unwelcome epistemic company ISIS is supposed to represent, 
and whether it really poses a problem in this case. After all, no one would even think to 
suggest that Blue Sky is a problem, so something other than logical compatibility must be 
behind the complaint. 
 At the other end of the spectrum that is anchored on one side by Extreme 
Steadfastness one finds: 
Extreme Sissociationism: In response to unwelcome epistemic company in believing that p, you 
should always reduce you credence in p by n degree and/or engage in introspective moral concern.14 
 
According to Extreme Dissociationism, one should take unwelcome epistemic company as 
a decisive reason to question one’s beliefs or moral character, and to do so in a highly 
specified way. Extreme Dissociationism is perhaps not common in self-application, but 
popular arguments that appeal to guilt-by-epistemic-association seem to presuppose 
something like it. Many people point out to critics of Israel that there are antisemites who 
also criticize Israel (indeed, with something like the structure of Selectivity in mind); in 
 
14  Cf. “Extreme conciliationism” in Worsnip (2007). For conciliationist views in the literature on 
disagreement, see Feldman (2007) and Matheson (2015). 
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2016 many pointed out to supporters of Bernie Sanders that some opponents of Hillary 
Clinton were sexist; and so on. It seems that Extreme Dissociationism, although perhaps 
not something we commonly apply to ourselves, is a popular tool in the hands of those 
assigning guilt-by-epistemic-association. 
 Like its steadfast counterpart, Extreme Dissociationism is far too strong. 
Unwelcome epistemic company (and higher-order evidence generally) really does 
sometimes pose a problem. But sometimes it does not, even a little bit, as Blue Sky shows 
clearly. The crucial step, again, is to determine whether the features that make the epistemic 
company unwelcome bear on a belief’s truth, normative status, etiology, or implications. 
If we were to avoid unwelcome epistemic company at all costs, then we would 
systematically guarantee getting matters wrong that our company gets right. 
 I commend the far more moderate—and flexible—principle of 
Moderate Dissociationism: Unwelcome agreement that p always provides some defeasible reason 
to doubt, revise, or recheck your belief that p. This reason comes in degrees of strength, depending 
on the case.15 
 
According to Moderate Dissociationism, Extreme Steadfastness is flat-out incorrect, and 
Extreme Dissociationism has only a kernel of truth in the most extreme cases. Unwelcome 
epistemic company is neither always nor never a problem, but it very often makes salient 
the possibility of a problem. This possibility should not be dismissed without ruling out 
 
15  Here I am sympathetic to Feldman (2009: 311), who writes similarly about the case of disagreement that 
“Exactly what impact [disagreement] will have on what is supported by your overall evidence is a complex 
matter and will depend upon the details of each  specific case.” See also Lackey’s (2010) “justificationist” 
view, according to which the strength of one’s epistemic justification in believing that p determines the degree 
to which peer disagreement warrants belief revision. These sorts of views strike me as eminently sensible, 
partly because of (rather than despite) their resistance to rigorous formulation in unambiguous principles. 
Worsnip (2014) also belongs in this camp. 
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that one is not guilty by epistemic association in one or more of the four ways. Some cases 
might be easy (e.g., Blue Sky), but some cases are hard (e.g., Refugees).16 
 Moderate Dissociationism is general enough to accommodate the facts that 
unwelcome epistemic company does not have to do only with the truth of one’s belief; it 
need not only require abandonment of belief; it may raise problems that are both moral and 
epistemic in nature; and it comes in varying degrees of strength. 
4. Disagreement 
The problem of unwelcome epistemic company bears an unmistakable resemblance 
to the problem of peer disagreement. Very roughly, the problem of peer disagreement is 
the problem posed by encountering disagreement about p from someone who you 
reasonably judge to be as epistemically well-positioned as you with respect to p. In both 
the cases of peer disagreement and unwelcome agreement, your belief that p can be 
challenged by the mere fact of another person’s or group’s attitude toward p, in light of 
your evaluation of them as agents. In the case of disagreement, the fact that someone 
believes ~p, together with the fact that the same person is an epistemic peer, puts pressure 
on your belief that p.17 In the problem of unwelcome epistemic company, the fact that 
 
16 What about the real life challenges that Chomsky and Trump address in the quotations that open this essay? 
Although I am sympathetic to Chomsky’s substantive position on the Soviet Union but not Trump’s 
substantive position on the Mussolinian adage, I think that both Chomsky and Trump ought to be more 
bothered by their unwelcome epistemic company than they actually are. 
17 Though see Hazlett (2012) for an interesting dissent that puts some space between higher-order evidence 
and first-order attitudes. According to Hazlett, peer disagreement puts pressure (primarily, at least) not on 
our first-order doxastic attitudes (our belief that p), but on our higher-order doxastic attitudes (our belief that 
our belief that p is reasonable or constitutes knowledge). Hazlett understands the epistemic virtue of 
intellectual humility in terms of having reasonable higher-order epistemic attitudes of the latter kind. It seems 
to me that an analogous approach could be taken toward the problems of unwelcome epistemic company. Cf. 
Lasonen-Aario (2014) for other routes to quarantining first-order attitudes from higher-order problems, 
though she ultimately thinks that we are guaranteed to face situations where we violate epistemic oughts. At 
the opposite extreme see Alexander (2013), who argues that at least one kind of higher-order epistemic 
attitude, what he calls “higher-order doubt,” undermines all first-order attitudes toward the relevant 
proposition, including suspension of judgment. 
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someone believes that p, together with the fact that the same person is either epistemically 
or morally compromised, puts pressure on your belief that p. As noted above, the possible 
responses to the problem are at least partly parallel, because both problems involve issues 
having to do with higher-order evidence. 
Another connection between unwelcome epistemic company and peer 
disagreement, worthy of investigation in its own right, is the role of moral considerations 
in each problem. It is tempting to think that the special relevance of moral characteristics 
is unique to the problem of unwelcome epistemic company, because there is arguably no 
analogue to either Vice or Implication in the case of disagreement. It may initially seem 
plausible that mere disagreement with an epistemic peer about p does not give one reason 
to suspect that there is some moral flaw in oneself, or that there are moral aspects of a view 
that one has missed in any systematic way. 
But this is much too quick. Just as unwelcome epistemic company might involve 
agreement from someone you take to be morally inferior in some relevant respect, so 
epistemic peer disagreement might involve disagreement from someone who you take to 
be morally superior in a relevant respect. For example, you might disagree with an 
epistemic peer about the best policies for alleviating poverty, but acknowledge that your 
peer, unlike you, actually performs admirable work among the poor. This sort of case could 
very well pose an analogue to Vice in the case of disagreement. The analogue to Vice is 
the worry that you disagree with your epistemic peer due to some vicious trait that you 
have which your peer lacks—e.g., insufficient love for those who are poor. Of course, this 
analogy requires that moral peer-hood is not a proper part of epistemic peer-hood. 
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There is not and cannot possibly be, however, an analogue for Implication in the 
case of peer disagreement. If you are subject to Implication, then by necessity you do not 
stand in a relation of epistemic peer disagreement. After all, the analogue of Implication 
would say that you endorse your view only because you, but not your interlocutor, are 
missing something important about the matter of disagreement. But if that is the case, then 
you and your interlocutor are not epistemic peers. 
The role of epistemic peer-hood itself provides a dissimilarity between the 
problems of disagreement and unwelcome epistemic company. Generally, an unstated 
assumption in the literature on disagreement is that disagreement with someone more 
expert than you poses an obvious problem for your belief, without the various puzzles 
attendant to the problem of peer disagreement. Supposing you are a layperson, we might 
say that encountering expert belief contrary to your own does nothing but intensify your 
epistemic problems.  
With unwelcome agreement, the issue is trickier. Here I will say something brief, 
though I think that this issue is worthy of further exploration in its own right. Unwanted 
expert agreement arguably does not generally intensify the epistemic problems of Falsity 
or Malfunction, provided that that expert beliefs are more likely than lay beliefs to be true 
and justified. Perhaps there are domains in which expert opinion is systematically 
epistemically corrupted, in which cases the condition wouldn’t hold. But I do not think that 
this will be the majority of cases. That being said, unwanted expert agreement may often 
intensify the moral problems of Vice and Implication, provided that experts are more likely 
than laypeople to have beliefs that are well-integrated with their moral vices, or are more 
likely to be aware of the implications of their beliefs. I do not know how often these two 
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contrasts between expert and lay opinion hold, but when they do, the relevance of expertise 
to the problem of unwelcome epistemic company will be asymmetrical in the way 
described.18 
 Finally, the problem of unwelcome epistemic company, although I think it is an 
important and neglected problem, nevertheless does not seem quite as worrisome as the 
problem of peer disagreement. For example, it seems that the ordinary Christian theist 
should be more worried about disagreement with atheist, Islamic, and other peers, than 
about unwelcome agreement with religious extremists. Why might this be? Two related 
reasons suggest themselves. First, for any view that we think we correctly hold, there is 
some reason to think that it is prima facie likely that at least some people who are bad at 
reasoning, or bad in some other way, will happen to hold the view. There are not good 
grounds for expecting that no one will endorse the right views for the wrong reasons. We 
expect to find unwelcome epistemic company, and so it is unsurprising when we do. In 
other words, we are not very surprised by certain kinds of epistemic luck, where people 
stumble upon the truth in epistemically or morally degenerate ways. On the other hand, for 
any view we correctly hold, it is prima facie likely that people who are as good at reasoning 
and epistemically well-positioned as us will hold our view, and unlikely that they will not.19 
That is to say, we do not expect (to the same degree) to find peer disagreement, and so it is 
surprising when we do. We are at least somewhat surprised by certain kinds of competent 
failure. 
 
18 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I comment on how expertise might affect the 
problem of unwanted epistemic company.  
19 In fact, some philosophers think that disagreement among idealized epistemic peers is not only unlikely, 
but impossible. See Lackey (2010) for this kind of point. See also King (2011). 
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 Of course, we can still ask relevant questions: Why is competent failure more 
surprising than lucky success? I do not have a full answer to this question (which deserves 
an inquiry in its own right), but I suspect that the answer has to do with the way in which 
we expect reality to regulate our beliefs. An epistemic agent who is functioning well (or 
who is rational, or… pick whatever epistemic desideratum you like) should, to that extent, 
track reality. Properly functioning perception of a tree, for example, should yield the belief 
that there is a tree. It would be extremely surprising if it did not. Another way to put the 
point: the failure of a properly functioning perceiver to acquire the appropriate perceptual 
beliefs demands explanation. On the other hand, malfunctioning cognitive faculties are not 
necessarily tracking anything at all; or, in realistic cases, such faculties are only partially 
tracking reality. So, while it is not wholly unsurprising when a malfunctioning perceiver 
acquires a correct perceptual belief, it is certainly not very surprising. Except in sufficiently 
extreme circumstances (especially when a malfunctioning perceiver is more likely than not 
to get matters wrong), the lucky success of a malfunctioning perceiver does not demand 
explanation. 
5. Conclusion 
 The problem of unwelcome epistemic company is, as far as I know, unexplored by 
philosophers, yet it is a problem of everyday life. This is unsurprising, because accusations 
of guilt-by-epistemic-association are asymmetrically popular: we tend to endorse them for 
people whose views we do not like and reject them in principle for views we do like. I think 
that the rejection is a mistake. There are relatively precise conditions in which different 
versions of the problem of epistemic company arise, and where different attendant 
responses are justified. By paying better attention to these conditions, we can achieve better 
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knowledge about not only other people and the truth generally, but about our own beliefs 
and moral character.20 
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